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Climate Change Mitigation and the U.N. Security Council:
A Just War Analysis
Harry van der Linden
1.
Prior to the agreement on climate change adopted in December 2015 in Paris during the twentyfirst session of the Conference of Parties (COP 21), under the auspices of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), quite a few scholars had discussed and
favored a robust role of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) in bringing about effective global
greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation. More hesitantly, some have supported the UNSC authorizing
military action against countries failing to mitigate in an adequate manner.1 I will argue here that
the shortcomings of the Paris Agreement are such that providing the UNSC with the authority to
enforce climate change mitigation through military coercion remains a significant option. To be
sure, the recent decision of the Trump administration to seek withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement means that the United States, for the time being at least, will likely veto any UNSC
authorization of military action aimed at climate change mitigation, but a vetoed decision would
still put moral and political pressure on countries with poor mitigation records, including the
United States, to improve their record. Also, a vetoed decision would be significant in providing
moral support for similarly motivated military action toward climate change mitigation outside
1. Lango, “Global Ethics and Global Climate Change,” supports UNSC authorization of military action as
a last resort measure, especially if the UNSC would become more representative; Scott, “The
Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” views it as potentially beneficial and focuses on the
likelihood of it happening (which she views as low); Ng, “Safeguarding Peace and Security in our
Warming World,” briefly notes some problems with a military response but she does not want to exclude
it; and Christiansen, Climate Conflicts, argues generally that future UNSC military authorization might be
justified. Cousins, “UN Security Council,” maintains that UNSC coercive climate action is legally
feasible but politically unrealistic, leading her to favor the UNSC playing a peaceful conflict resolution
role between states with opposed adaptation and mitigation goals. Finally, Gilley and Kinsella, “Coercing
Climate Action,” think UNSC authorization is unlikely but hold that limited military force might be
justified by countries as an act of individual or collective self-defense.
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the UNSC framework. I will argue, however, that the option of the UNSC coercing GHG
mitigation is morally flawed and ultimately antithetical to effectively addressing climate change.
My assessment will be based significantly on jus ad bellum principles of the just war tradition,
taking into account some feminist critiques of this tradition. Relatedly, I will briefly contest Bill
McKibben’s proposal that we should view climate change as a third world war, requiring a
mobilization similar to the one undertaken to defeat fascism in World War II. More broadly, I
will argue in conclusion that “war is not the answer” with regard to avoiding disastrous climate
change; rather, hope is to be found in massive nonviolent resistance to non-mitigating countries
and increased local efforts of adopting green technologies.
2.
Understandably, after more than two decades of failed global climate change negotiations, the
Paris Agreement was widely praised and even celebrated in the public media. Yet the Agreement
failed to live up to its proclaimed aim [stated in Article 2 (a)] of “holding the increase in the
global average temperature to well below 2° C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5° C above pre-industrial levels.” The problem is that the
promised GHG mitigation goals, including both reduced GHG emissions and larger GHG sinks,
as voluntarily set by most states participating in COP 21 fall far short of ensuring this aim and
are expected to lead to as much as 3° C rise in global average temperature by the end of the
century.2 The Paris Agreement seeks to deal with this problem by committing states to adjust and
improve every five years, beginning in 2020, their mitigation goals, which are called “Nationally
Determined Contributions” (NDCs), and this process is supposed to continue until the aim of
global average temperature increase well below 2° C is met. Will this process be effective?
On a positive note, the ratification of the Paris Agreement required that at least 55
countries accounting for at least 55% of global GHG emissions signed the Agreement, and this
requirement was met in early October 2016. Thus the Agreement went into force on November 4,
2016. A crucial step toward ratification was that China and the United States at the G20 summit
in China (September 2016) provided notice of ratification. A worry was that (former) President
Obama sidestepped the treaty confirmation role of the Senate in the ratification process,
reflecting that the Senate might not have ratified the Paris Agreement due to general Republican
2. See Climate Action Tracker, “Global Temperatures.”
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hostility to GHG mitigation. This hostility was again on display in broad Republican support in
Congress for President Trump’s decision on June 1, 2017, to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.
In his withdrawal announcement, Trump defended his decision primarily by arguing that
“the Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement
that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries.” Trump
specifically mentioned that the Paris Agreement allows China “to increase [its] emission by a
staggering number of years – 13,” while “India makes its participation contingent on receiving
billions and billions and billions of dollars in foreign aid from developed countries.” He
continued: “There are many other examples. But the bottom line is that the Paris Accord is very
unfair, at the highest level, to the United States.” Trump echoed here a complaint of unfairness
launched by the United States since the earliest attempts to negotiate a climate change agreement
centered on the notion that different demands should be placed on developed and developing
countries since the developing countries have shorter histories of significant GHG emissions than
most developed countries and so are lesser contributors to climate change, have much lower per
capita emissions than most developed countries, and seek rapid growth, if necessary with cheap
fossil fuels (as did once the developed countries). The problem with the Paris Agreement is not
lack of fairness, but that the peak emissions of most developed nations are not reduced quickly
enough and that those of China are delayed until 2030 and those of India have an open-ended
date, making projected global mitigation fall short of the goal of keeping the global temperature
increase well below 2° C.3 What adds to the problem is that the Green Climate Fund, established
in 2010 (at COP 16) to enable developing countries such as India to adopt green technologies
more rapidly (and also assist in the adaptation to climate change), might not be large enough to
sufficiently reduce their peak emissions at an early enough date. Surely, the Trump
administration has added to this problem by refusing to fulfill the initial American pledge,
grossly overstated by Trump, of 3 billion, 1 billion of which was paid by the Obama
administration.
3. See Climate Action Tracker, “Rating countries.” Ironically, Trump in his withdrawal speech also notes
the inadequacy of the Paris Agreement. He overstates the issue, claiming that the agreement will reduce
global temperatures only by 0.2° C, and then argues that the economic costs for the United States are not
worth it. Trump’s argument does not mean that he takes anthropogenic climate change seriously now
(after having called it a “hoax” on earlier occasions); after all, no mention is made in his speech of how to
address climate change other than a vague and unrealistic claim that he is prepared to renegotiate the Paris
Agreement.
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The long-term impact of the American withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is uncertain.
The withdrawal will not be completed until close to the next presidential election and new
leadership might re-engage with the Agreement. The negative impact of the withdrawal and the
support of the Trump administration for weakening EPA regulations affecting GHG emissions
and expanding fossil-fuel extraction, including coal, within the United States will to some extent
be offset by the fact that a large number of state governments, such as California and New York,
and numerous cities have declared to uphold the Paris mitigation target of the United States or go
beyond it. China and the EU might also in response to the withdrawal accelerate the
implementation of their mitigation goals.4 Still, the withdrawal of the United States as the
world’s second largest GHG emitter is a clear setback and might lead other countries to weaken
their renewable energy endeavors. More generally, the rise of nationalism and rightwing
populism does not bode well for the articulation of NDCs focused on the interest of future
generations rather than on short-term national interests. In short, the Paris Agreement might not
only fail to meet its ultimate temperature reduction aim, but it also might fail to realize even its
current NDC promises. Once the Agreement unravels, the world might be on its way, in a
manner that could be largely irreversible, from severe climate change (occurring with a 3° C
increase in global average temperature) to catastrophic climate change (occurring with an
increase in global average temperature above 5° C).5 The Paris Agreement offers little to prevent
its unraveling since it lacks any enforcement mechanism other than the public naming and
“shaming” of countries that fail to meet or improve their NDCs.6
3.
In light of the weaknesses of the Paris Agreement, the uncertainly created by American
withdrawal, and the extreme urgency of effectively addressing climate change in the coming
decades, it is important to consider recent proposals to the effect that the UNSC should address
4. See Boffey and Neslen, “China and EU respond to Trump with a new climate alliance.”
5. See Campbell and Parthemore, “National Security and Climate Change in Perspective.”
6. The Paris Agreement does not cover aviation and international shipping, each accounting for as much
as 3% of human-caused climate change. It is unclear at this moment whether the Trump administration
will disregard various international arrangements (partly in progress) to reduce the climate change impact
of these sources. In October 2016, the signatories of the 1987 Montreal Protocol eliminating the ozonedepleting CFC refrigerants agreed to gradually phase out most of the current use of HFC refrigerants by
2045. HFCs are also extremely harmful GHGs. It seems that the Trump administration will uphold this
amendment.
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climate change, including the most far-reaching suggestion that the UNSC take coercive
political, economic, and military measures (Chapter VII measures) against individual states
failing to mitigate. Certainly, we should expect that the voices for more UNSC involvement will
become stronger if the Paris Agreement would begin to fall apart.
Placing the authority to respond to countries with poor mitigation records in the hands of
the UNSC seems a logical and final step of the so-called “securitization of climate change.” In
the words of international relations scholar Shirley V. Scott, “securitization [in general] involves
referring to an issue that has hitherto been conceptualized ‘only’ in political, economic,
environmental or other terms as a security threat so as to heighten awareness of the issue and the
urgency of taking effective action.” 7 Examples other than climate change are the securitization of
pandemic diseases and environmental degradation (such as loss of bio-diversity). The process of
the securitization of climate change has been under way for some time. The UNSC debated
climate change for the first time on April 17, 2007, and subsequently in 2011, 2013, and 2015.
Overall, it seems that most countries from the Global South (G77) participating in these debates
opposed making climate change an UNSC issue in any form, presumably being wary of
“Western interventionism,” while many supporting countries of the North typically favored some
non-coercive UNSC role.8 Still, there has also been a growing recognition among UNSC
members (as well as within the UN at large) that global warming is a “threat multiplier” in that
the effects of global warming, such as reduced resources (water, arable land, food), economic
damage and land loss due to rising sea levels, and migration caused by environmental
degradation, may deepen existing tensions and conflicts, both within and between states. 9 And at
a March, 2015, UNSC meeting, initiated by New Zealand, a sympathetic hearing was given to
the concern of small island states that climate change, by causing rising sea levels and increased
tropical storms, goes beyond being a threat multiplier and poses for them a direct existential
security threat.10 In other words, climate change may not only increase sources of conflict, but
may also pose a direct threat to state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, the U.S.
government and the Department of Defense (DoD) have recognized the security implications of
7. Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” 221.
8. See Cousins, “UN Security Council,” 201-05. The notable exceptions among the G77 countries are the
small island states, such as the Republic of Maldives.
9. See Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” 225-226. See also Gilley and
Kinsella, “Coercing Climate Action,” 13.
10. See Climate Home, “UN Security council hears climate fears of small island states.”
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climate change, addressing the issue in the National Security Strategy of 2015 and the DoD’s
Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (2014) and its National Security Implications of ClimateRelated Risks and a Changing Climate (2015).11 More specifically, it is widely acknowledged
that the current conflict in Syria that began in 2011 has been partly caused by social and political
unrest rooted in its climate change-related extreme drought between 2007 and 2010.
Since climate change has undeniable security consequences, the UNSC, if it has not
already done so, will sooner or later adopt Chapter VII measures in response to conflict caused or
worsened by climate change. 12 Such UNSC measures would fall basically within the sphere of
adaptation to climate change since the focus is on addressing the negative consequences of this
change.13 Full securitization of climate change, however, would go beyond this type of action
toward the enforcement of mitigation standards necessary to prevent irreversible severe or
catastrophic climate change. In other words, the shift is from addressing only the consequences
of climate change toward also addressing its causes. 14 One way to envision this full securitization
is that the UNSC would take Chapter VII measures with regard to states that fail to meet their
NDCs or fail to make necessary adjustments to their NDCs at future COP meetings.
Alternatively, the UNSC could set a global standard concerning the allowable per capita GHG
emissions (with the aim of limiting global warming to well below 2° C) and adopt coercive
measures against countries failing to meet this standard (even after they have acquired tradable
GHG emissions permits from low-emitting countries). No doubt, this latter approach would be in
theory more effective in curtailing climate change, but it would also be less feasible (both in
terms of arriving at standards and enforcing them), and so let me focus on the first approach. 15
Let me call a state that fails to meet or improve its NDC a “non-mitigator.” The non-mitigator
may be a free-rider or blindly hope that future technology will solve the problem; or the failure
to mitigate adequately may be rooted in a denial of climate change or in the conviction that

11. The DoD reports are also concerned with how the U.S. military can reduce its GHG footprint and how
it should anticipate changes in its operations due to climate change, such as rising sea levels.
12. Scott suggests that the UNSC already passed a Chapter VII measure with Operation Restore Hope in
response to the crisis in Somalia partly caused by climate change-induced drought. See “The
Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” 223.
13. See Scott, “Implications of climate change for the UN Security Council,” 1321, 1326.
14. Ibid., 1326.
15. Cf. Ng, “Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming World,” 292, who argues that instead of the
UNSC setting its own standards, it would be better for the UNSC to enforce the mitigation standards of
the Kyoto Protocol or any future climate agreement.
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climate change is not significantly caused by human conduct. So, on this account, the United
States is becoming a non-mitigator under the Trump administration, and India continuing on a
course of economic nationalism and/or receiving inadequate international support for green
technologies might become a non-mitigator. A full securitization of climate change would mean
that the UNSC would consider Chapter VII measures against non-mitigators. Conceivably, the
UNSC could also play a role in the enforcement of creating climate funds for mitigation and
adaptation in developing countries, and it could create a tribunal for political leaders committing
the crime of non-mitigation. Moreover, the UNSC also could take Chapter VI (“Pacific
Settlement of Disputes”) measures when disputes rooted in climate change would emerge.
However, I will focus here on the following question: In case that the Paris accord would begin
to unravel, should we support the UNSC taking military measures (after political and economic
coercion has failed) to discourage and modify non-mitigators?
4.
A clear cost of this kind of full securitization of climate change is reduced participation by states
in deciding an effective climate change regime and coercive measures taking the place of
voluntary cooperation.16 The Paris Agreement involved the participation and cooperation of the
community of states with most states articulating national mitigation goals to get the process
going, and its ratification also required the explicit voluntary commitment of many states. The
full securitization of climate change, to the contrary, places the responsibility of states to avoid
severe or catastrophic climate change significantly in the hands of a small group of countries, the
five permanent members of the UNSC and its additional ten rotating members, and this more
limited participation of states will lead to coercive UNSC resolutions. What would offset the
costs of reduced participation is that the UN General Assembly would initiate or encourage
action against non-mitigators on basis of article 11 (3) of the U.N. Charter, allowing it to “call
the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international
peace and security.”17 At any rate, the costs would not constitute a decisive objection to full

16. Cf. Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” 222-23.
17. Cf. Lango, “Global Ethics and Global Climate Change.” The General Assembly adopted a much
weaker resolution in 2009 (GA Res. 63/281), maintaining that the UNFCCC is the “key instrument”
addressing climate change but also calling on all relevant UN bodies to consider the security implications
of climate change. Cousins, “UN Security Council,” 202, cites this resolution but neglects to note that the
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securitization of climate change if we were to conclude that UNSC climate action would be both
effective and necessary in order to prevent the ravages of severe or catastrophic climate change.
On the precipice, it might be justified to replace the persuasion of words by the persuasion of
(threat of) weapons.
However, does the UNSC, on the basis of the U.N. Charter, have the legal authority to
adopt a resolution to resort to force, or to use the threat of force, in order to coerce nonmitigators to mend their ways? In addressing this question, it is instructive to examine how Silke
Marie Christiansen justifies a GHG mitigation role for the UNSC in her Climate Conflicts. On
her account, the UNSC may authorize military measures when article 2 (4) of the U.N. charter –
prohibiting all members from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state” – is violated. Controversially, Christiansen argues that we
should interpret the “use of force” not just as involving the use of military force, but more
broadly as collective human behavior that threatens or leads to the violation of state sovereignty.
Most dramatically, states responsible for climate change cause this kind of violation when rising
sea levels lead to loss of territory or even threaten statehood as in the case of such small island
states as the Republic of Maldives. Christiansen notes that a problem with this analysis of the
“use of force” is that damaging operations of nature caused by climate change, unlike military
attacks, “are not necessarily humanly intended.”18 She responds that, in the future at least, large
GHG emitters may be construed as hostile once green technologies become more readily
available, affordable, and are not used by them on a wide scale. Thus Christiansen concludes that
the UNSC should at least have a future role in responding coercively and militarily to such major
hostile emitters.19
A difficulty of Christiansen’s analysis is that it does not seem to offer a convincing
guideline concerning which countries should possibly be subjected to UNSC actions. Unlike a
military attack, climate change as “use of force” is foremost an emerging threat that will not fully
materialize for many decades. To be sure, serious environmental damages are already occurring,
as well as numerous human casualties, but they are small as compared to anticipated future
GA reaffirmed the central role of the UNFCCC.
18. Christiansen, Climate Conflicts, 183.
19. Ibid., 184. See also ibid., 244. Christiansen argues against the idea that climate change is a threat that
might trigger the right to self-defense against “armed attack” articulated in article (51) of the U.N. Charter
because, among other reasons, “defining the emission of GHGs as armed attack will definitely overstretch
the meaning of article 51” (ibid., 185).
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harms if GHG emissions continue on their current trajectory. Looking to past GHG emissions, it
would be hard to single out particular states as responsible for climate change since most states
have contributed to the unfolding threat of rising sea levels for, say, the Republic of Maldives,
and no specific state by itself made the difference so that it alone could be held responsible for
the environmental threat. Of course, all major historical emitters could be collectively held
responsible, but then who would authorize and execute UNSC resolutions against this collective?
Looking forward to future GHG emissions, the main historical emitters are not necessarily the
ones who will satisfy the requirement of hostile intention because they may adopt green
technologies on a broad scale, while large future emitters with hostile intention might be overall
less responsible for climate change than the main historical emitters because they might have
limited GHG emission histories. And what further complicates the issue is that GHG emissions
in one country (e.g., China) might be significantly caused by its production for export, placing
the responsibility for the emissions partly in the hands of the importing countries.
UNSC action against states failing to adhere to, or improve, their NDCs seems largely to
avoid these difficulties of determining which countries should be liable to UNSC action. The
UNSC has the legal authority to respond to “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression” (article 39). To view climate change as an act of aggression or a breach of the
peace is questionable, but it is clearly a threat to the peace. We need not establish differential
responsibility for causing this threat on basis of the GHG emission records of individual states.
Instead, it suffices to note that the Paris Agreement seeks to reduce and prevent the threat. Nonmitigators risk the unraveling of the Paris Agreement and so they pose a threat to the peace and
are subject to UNSC action. The shift here is significantly from backward-looking responsibility
and blame for climate harm to forward-looking responsibility for contributing to preventing
climate harm, a shift that facilitates and encourages cooperation.20 However, blame becomes
appropriate again with regard to non-mitigators, and the scale of GHG emissions remains
morally relevant because the risk of the unraveling of the Paris Agreement will increase the
greater role a non-mitigator has to play in reducing global GHG emissions. The UNSC in
seeking to uphold the Paris Agreement should first implore non-mitigators to solve their dispute
20. See Young, Responsibility for Justice. Following Young, climate change is a structural injustice and
she argues that such injustices are best solved by switching from a backward-looking discourse of blame
for the injustice toward a forward-looking discourse of taking on responsibility for eliminating the
injustice.
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about their NDCs with other parties to the accord in a peaceful manner (Chapter VI measures),
and if this would fail, Chapter VII measures culminating in military action would be appropriate.
A serious problem with the UNSC authorizing military measures with regard to climate
change is that three (China, the United States, and Russia) of the current top five GHG emitters
(also including the E.U. and India) have veto power as permanent members of the UNSC (and
France may veto on behalf of the E.U.). Thus, even if the non-permanent members would have a
strong green agenda, the military measures would inevitably be selective and exclude some
potential large non-mitigators. Generally, one would expect military actions are more likely to be
authorized against militarily weaker non-mitigating countries, which also tend to be smaller
GHG emitters. Accordingly, it is not surprising that, overall, countries from the Global South,
even though they are likely to be the greatest victims of severe or catastrophic climate change
because these countries will have fewer resources to deal with its negative impacts, have been
least sympathetic to putting climate change on the UNSC agenda, fearing Western
interventionism and neo-colonialism. Most immediately, UNSC military action against nonmitigators is not to be expected since the United States as non-mitigator will not only veto any
resolution against itself but also will likely veto any UNSC military action against other
countries in order to avoid appearing blatantly hypocritical.
Still, the option of considering UNSC military action against non-mitigators remains
relevant for several reasons. First, the United States may rejoin the Paris Agreement and, so,
military coercion against countries that willfully ignore their NDCs may become feasible. To be
sure, this coercion would likely be selective and aimed at smaller military powers, but a case
could be made that non-mitigating small countries set a bad precedent and the extreme urgency
of addressing climate change outweighs the selectivity problem. Second, even if the United
States were to veto all UNSC resolutions concerning military coercion against non-mitigators, a
vetoed decision would still put moral and political pressure on non-mitigators to improve their
record. Third, a vetoed resolution would offer moral support for mitigating countries to engage in
military coercion against non-mitigators outside the UNSC framework. Certainly, repeated
vetoed decisions would gradually create a norm of when military action against non-mitigators
would be justified. We may then anticipate that this norm would come to guide military action
executed and approved by a large majority of mitigating counties against non-mitigators.
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5.
This brings us to the crux of the matter: Can military force authorized by the UNSC against nonmitigators be morally justified? This question, unlike the issues of whether the UNSC in fact will
increasingly be concerned with climate change and has the legal authority do so, has not yet
received much attention. 21 Let me address this question on basis of just (resort to) war (jus ad
bellum) principles, keeping in mind that the analysis bears more broadly on how we view the
idea of (military) violence for the sake of combatting climate change. I have already addressed to
some extent the jus ad bellum requirement that resort to military force must be decided by a
legitimate authority – that is, an authority with moral competency and legitimacy. The UNSC
has the legal authority to initiate military action against non-mitigators, but the veto system
weakens its moral authority in that a more representative UNSC without the veto system is more
likely to arrive at impartial decisions, taking into account a broader range of voices and interests.
Another problem with the moral authority of the UNSC is that this body lacks any
articulated standards for deciding whether in a particular case resort to force is morally
warranted. Notably, the UNSC did not adopt in 2005 “five criteria of legitimacy” recommended
in A More Secure World, Report of the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change. These criteria are similar to common jus ad bellum principles, and in
the absence of such criteria UNSC resolutions might be decided by power politics rather than by
seeking justice. Accordingly, UNSC resort to force against non-mitigators will inevitably raise
the doubt that the decision might not accord with the jus ad bellum principle of right intention,
requiring that both the decision to resort to military action and its execution are guided by
justice, not extraneous political interests.
A third jus ad bellum principle is that military action should have a reasonable chance of
success. Success in the present context would mean that as a result of UNSC-initiated military
action a non-mitigator would come to adopt adequate GHG mitigation measures, such as the
widespread introduction of green technology and/or the adoption of consumption patterns with
greatly reduced GHG footprints. What also seems to be necessary is that military action would
affect the elimination of climate change ignorance and apathy within non-mitigating countries.
How can military force affect these changes? Air campaigns as the current dominant mode of
military coercion, say against coal energy plants, do not guarantee that greener technologies will
21. An exception is Lango, “Global Ethics and Global Climate Change.”
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be chosen; instead, dirtier coal burning might result. An extensive air campaign would also be
inadequate because it does not create green “hearts and minds.” In short, regime change seems
essential, and this requires troops on the ground as well as long-term political and cultural
investments. The recent record of bringing about successful regime change through military
force and aid is abysmal. It also raises the question: Which countries would deliver the military
force and aid and would they be up to the task of changing “hearts and minds”?
Admittedly, it might be the case that the use of military force, or the threat thereof, as
well as coercive economic and political measures, may motivate a country to make some
changes in its environmental policies. Perhaps such actions, for example, may stop the burning
of tropical forests, especially when neighboring countries would be directly affected, but the
issue here is not whether coercion can make some difference on some occasions. Rather, I am
contesting that military force is a convincing coercive instrument that may lead a country to
transform from a non-mitigator to an important supporter of and contributor to, a global
mitigation program such as the Paris Agreement.
The difficulties of a successful climate change mitigation war suggest that the
proportionality principle might not be satisfied. A protracted war would be counter to the
expected good of the war – greatly reduced GHG emissions – since war itself creates huge GHG
emissions due to the fact that most mobile instruments of war are fuel-driven. An irony of the
securitization of climate change is that the military is a major GHG emitter, in times of peace and
especially when at war. 22 Moreover, war is antithetical to reducing GHG emissions because
refineries may be bombed, deforestation may occur, and, as previously noted, people may revert
to cheaper and dirtier forms of energy, such as coal and dung, when energy grids are disrupted. It
should also be noted that the production of the instruments of war involves high GHG emissions
and the same is true of rebuilding the devastation that war typically leaves behind. So even if we
would not incorporate other bad outcomes of war, such as the loss of human lives, the wounded,
and the psychological casualties, and we would focus on GHG emissions alone, the bad results
of war might outweigh its anticipated (but questionable) good results, and so a climate-change
war might violate the principle of proportionality.
More specifically, some of the Gulf States, such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates,
22. The Pentagon is the largest single consumer of petroleum in the world and contributes as much as 5%
of GHG emissions in the United States. See Sanders, The Green Zone: 51—53, 68.
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have the highest per capita emissions in the world. Now assume that these states continue with
excessive fuel-driven consumption patterns and try to keep their market share by selling their oil
cheaply. This would make them good candidates for military coercion. But then consider what
happened during the Gulf War. The Iraqi troops withdrawing from Kuwait sought to destroy its
resources, setting fire to hundreds of oil wells, which led to burning gas and oil for up to nine
months, as well as to huge oil leaks on land and in the sea. A thousand people died because of
smoke inhalation and the equivalent of several months of US GHG emissions went up in the
air.23 It is not farfetched to assume that similar events might repeat themselves in protest against
an UNSC-sanctioned military attack and occupation.
The two final just war principles for assessing resort to force with regard to nonmitigators are the just cause and last resort principles. I will briefly address the issue of last
resort within the context of examining the just cause of UNSC-initiated war against nonmitigators. Two questions seem essential. First, is climate-change war the type of war that we
recognize as conceivably having a just cause? Second, can we justify war against GHG nonmitigators in the sense that those individuals who enable their country to fall short in mitigation
efforts are proper targets of force? In other words, is there something about these individuals
who fail to address their GHG emissions or enable others to do so that justifies that violence is
used against them or that their right to life is negated?
We have previously noted that the threat posed by climate change, although presently
unfolding, is foremost an emerging threat, i.e., a threat that will increasingly materialize if very
significant mitigation does not take place. Accordingly, it seems most plausible to view military
force authorized by the UNSC against non-mitigators as a preventive war (rather than as a war of
self-defense): non-mitigators may cause the collapse of the Paris Agreement and once this accord
falls apart it will be much harder and costlier to avert severe or catastrophic climate change in the
future, and success might be uncertain and, at best, partial. One problem with this argument for
preventive war is that it is more convincing with regard to very large GHG emitters than small
emitters and war is least feasible against them. Furthermore, there are two familiar objections to
preventive war, say, as it has been defended in the context of preventing “rogue states” from
acquiring nuclear weapons (and other WMD): Just war theory traditionally has defined a just
cause as involving a wrong done and in the case of preventive war there is only a suspicion of a
23. See ibid., 110.
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future wrong; the principle of last resort is hard to satisfy since the anticipated wrong is a future
wrong allowing for nonviolent measures to avert it. In the case of climate change preventive war,
the problem that no wrong has been committed is less convincing since non-mitigation is an
unfolding wrong and antithetical to climate change governance. Still, non-mitigating countries
might promise to do much more at a later date, or they may engage in developing GHG
absorption technologies, as well as new types of green energy, such as fusion, arguing that this is
their contribution to the Paris Agreement. 24 Such responses would make resort to force against
these countries especially hard to justify. Relatedly, it is somewhat doubtful that the wrong done
by small non-mitigators is really a threat to the Paris Agreement and could unravel it. After all,
could other countries not compensate for the non-mitigators, increasing their mitigation efforts
rather than opt for resort to force? Finally, the time frame of the dissolution of the Paris
Agreement and the emergence of severe or catastrophic climate change is such that it becomes
hard to stipulate that military force would be a last resort measure. There is enough time first to
try diplomatic and non-military coercive measures and there is no clear point of when this
endeavor should stop before the gathering dangers at the horizon allow no further delay of a
military response.
Even if we grant that non-mitigation in some scenarios might constitute a definite threat
to the Paris Agreement (or any other global climate accord) of a magnitude such that resort to
force would be a just cause, the just cause principle also requires that the threat is of a kind (type)
that warrants killing. Typically, millions of civilians of a non-mitigating state participate in
creating its unacceptable GHG emissions, and it seems indefensible to claim that their conduct
makes them liable to military attack. To be liable to attack one must be instrumental in the
infliction of immediate life-threatening violence, making counter-violence necessary to protect
lives. Similarly, it seems an error to argue that those who would protect the civilians from attack
and seek to preserve the political self-determination of their community would in this way
become morally liable to attack. In other words, the soldiers of a non-mitigating state are not
morally liable to attack for defending their state. To be sure, this self-defense might be wrong in
some cases, as when soldiers protect their own civilians engaged in acts of genocide, but in the
case of civilian non-mitigators the wrong done by the civilians, unlike the wrong done by
24. For a criticism of technocratic approaches to climate change mitigation, see Klein, This Changes
Everything, Part Two. Still, uncertainty about future technological possibilities may make it harder to
justify military force against non-mitigators.
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genocidaires, is not of a nature that makes their protectors liable to attack. This leaves us with
political and civilian leaders and their role in non-mitigation. If their support of non-mitigation
expresses the popular will, then their shared responsibility does not make them liable to military
attack. If the leaders act contrary to the popular will, then the appropriate response seems that the
people should be encouraged to seek their replacement or overthrow. In my view, the only
instances in which violence against non-mitigators might be appropriate is that the nonmitigating countries would respond violently against nonmilitary UNSC measures aimed at
promoting mitigation or would brutally repress nonviolent individual actions in support of
mitigation. The actions may be local or originate from other countries. Since GHG emissions
have no borders and affect humanity as such, foreign protestors of the emissions of nonmitigating countries should be allowed to cross the borders of these countries and nonviolently
express their opposition. The human rights of green nonviolent resisters, no matter their country
of origin, should be protected by the global community, and harm against them should trigger
coercive sanctions. By the same logic, non-mitigators have no right to refuse entry to climate
refugees and the refugees should be protected from violence. In all these cases, the justificatory
standards of defensive military force should be similar to those of traditional humanitarian
intervention.
6.
Feminists have criticized the just war tradition and also articulated pacifist and nonpacifist alternatives.25 Let me briefly discuss how the feminist critique applies to the proposal of
full securitization of climate change, focusing on two common criticisms of just war thinking in
general. The first criticism is that just war thinkers tend to use abstraction in ways that turn us
away from the particular horrors of wars. The focus in just war theory is on principles and
abstract causes, not on violence against the body. Most glaringly, talk about “precision strikes,”
“strategic strikes,” “collateral damage,” and the like, move the mind away from burning flesh,

25. I hold that the feminist critique of just war theory should be used to improve just war theory. This is
also the view of Peach, “An Alternative to Pacifism,” 154, 164-67. More specifically, I have used this
critique to support the view that just war theory needs to be supplemented by jus ante bellum (or just
military preparedness) principles. See, for example, my “From Hiroshima to Baghdad.” For additional
articles on this topic, see http://works.bepress.com/harry_vanderlinden.
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exploding brains, and the like. 26 Now in the case of the proposal of the full securitization of
climate change, it seems that abstract talk about “force” and “threat” may lead us astray. A
military threat is rather different from a climate threat, and military force is rather different from
the force resulting from climate change. Hostility is one feature of this difference, making war
violence in various degrees personal. A storm is not a “wind of hate.” 27 There is also a difference
in suddenness and immediacy, leaving victims physically and emotionally paralyzed.
Interpersonal violence especially cuts off all options and terrorizes. It is, of course, this
psychological feature of violence that makes people fear terrorism beyond any proportion of its
actual harm. Focusing on the nature of military violence should lead us to become more
constrained about when counter-violence might be justified. It is only when violence is physical
violence that the defining features of violence come to the foreground, making counter-violence
necessary and just, while when violence is only a metaphor or a resemblance of violence we
should reject counter-violence. In other words, we should reject physical (subjective) violence as
a response to “climate force,” “climate threat,” “ecological violence,” and even “structural or
systemic violence.”28
A striking example of viewing climate change as violence is to be found in Bill
McKibben’s recent essay “A World at War.” He writes: “We’re under attack from climate
change…. World War III is well and truly underway. And we are losing…. Carbon and methane
are seizing physical territory, sowing havoc and panic, racking up casualties, and even
destabilizing governments…. It’s not that global warming is like a world war. It is a world war.”
He adds: “The question is not, are we in a world war? The question is, will we fight back? And if
we do, can we actually defeat an enemy as powerful and inexorable as the laws of physics?” 29
For McKibben, we will only win the climate-change world war if the people would mobilize in a
way similar to the total mobilization of the American people in response to the threat of fascism
after Pearl Harbor during the Second World War. Then we responded with rapid and massive
development of weapons industries; now we should respond similarly by immediately creating
on a massive scale solar panels and wind turbines. Then the people swept aside the isolationist
26. See Peach, “An Alternative to Pacifism?,” 158. See also Hun, “An Evaluation of Feminist Critiques of
Just War Theory.”
27. Cf. Grossman, On Killing, 76-82, who uses this expression to refer to the deep trauma of being
confronted with hostility, as distinct from threats lacking hostile intent.
28. See in more detail in my “On the Violence of Systemic Violence.”
29. McKibben, “A World at War,”
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“America Firsters”; now we must sweep aside the lack of cooperation and obstructionist policies
of fossil-fuel industries. And, finally, we should not think that the Paris Agreement is victory and
will take care of the unfolding threat of a world at war, replicating Chamberlain’s misguided
hope after Munich.
What is misleading about this analysis is that the anthropogenic character of climate
change disappears: the enemy is “carbon and methane,” not, say, the fossil-fuel industries and
factory farming. It is easy to see why McKibben argues this way: he has no place for soldiers
killing those causally responsible for climate change. This is fair enough, but then the notion of
climate change as war should be set aside. This notion also obfuscates the different character of
military attacks and its harms and the operations of climate change and its negative impacts.
Indeed, McKibben seems to indirectly acknowledge this latter point when he notes that one
problem with the war of climate change is that there is no Pearl Harbor moment, mobilizing the
people to fight against this war. McKibben appeals to a familiar idea that only war can push
people to unite and concentrate their efforts on a common goal. There is some sad truth in this,
but the idea neglects that war also creates hatred, virulent nationalism, etc. At any rate, the
reference to World War II mobilization is flawed in that it is unlikely that the US government
will direct and coordinate the fight against the “enemy”, as happened in World War II. 30 Instead,
it seems that organizing from below by environmental groups needs to (continue to) play a
pivotal role, including obstruction of governmental policies and business practices counter to
GHG mitigation. Another problem is that the portrayal of climate change as war suggests that
optimal weapons (solar, wind, electric cars, etc.) are crucial to winning the “war,” neglecting that
the broader issue is how capitalist society focused on growth and profit maximization is
continuously undermining the natural environment conducive to human flourishing. In other
words, we need not only a technological transformation but also a value transformation. 31
This points to a second feminist critique of the just war tradition. In the words of Carol
Cohn and Sara Ruddick, the critique is that “just war theorists tend to abstract particular wars
30. Accordingly, calls for a World War II mobilization without describing climate change as a war are also
flawed. In Unprecedented Climate Mobilization, Woodworth and Griffin make such a call (26-53) and
also discuss prior similar calls made during the past decade (39-41). More promising are their suggestions
for nonviolent citizen strategies to transform the status quo (91-108).
31. Cf. Godoy and Jaffe, “We Don’t Need a ‘War’ on Climate Change.” I am sympathetic to their view
that what is needed instead of war is revolution, but it goes beyond the scope of this chapter to argue for
this claim. Of course, my criticism of McKibben here is only directed against his essay “A World at War,”
and not against his broader work and activism.
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from the war system on which they rely and which they strengthen.” This “war system” involves:
“arming, training, and organizing for possible wars; allocating the resources these preparations
require; creating a culture in which wars are seen as morally legitimate, even alluring; and
shaping and fostering the masculinities and femininities that undergird men’s and women’s
acquiescence to war.”32 In terms of the securitization of climate change, the problem is that the
neglect of the war system involves a neglect of how the preparation for war, materially and
culturally, is antithetical to realizing strong GHG mitigation goals. We have already touched
upon the material opposition between weapons production and testing, and fighting, on the one
hand, and GHG mitigation on the other hand. The cultural opposition is that the dominant
morality of war as an ethics of control, domination, hierarchy, and expansion seems rather
opposed to the type of individual and social green ethics required to turn around climate change,
that is, an ethics of simplicity, limitation, and humility concerning our place in nature. 33 It also
must be an ethics of resistance, but one that seeks, with an eye on future reconciliation,
nonviolent action (protest, noncooperation, civil disobedience, and nonviolent intervention)
toward opposing forces rather than their destruction.
7.
In conclusion, the U.N. Charter aimed “to save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war,” and it is certainly the case that climate change is a “threat multiplier” and may play a
significant role in bringing about future conflicts. Still, the view of climate change as a threat to
peace warranting UNSC authorization of military force to reduce the threat is mistaken. The
harms of climate change and the violence of humans should not be equated, and mitigation wars
will be counterproductive and in violation of just war norms. The idea that the UN Security
Council can rescue us from severe or catastrophic climate change by enforcing a global
mitigation schema is implausible and strengthens both materially and culturally the existing war
system. War will indeed result when global mitigation fails, but it is likely to be war to maintain
access to resources and arable land as well as to keep climate refugees out of the affluent
countries. The best safeguard against a future of military eco-apartheid is a mass movement of
32. Cohn and Ruddick, “A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 406.
33. Cf. Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time, 186-87. More bellicose and realist understandings of just war
theory seem to adhere to this morality of war, while Peach’s feminist reconceptualization of just war
theory seems closer to embracing the values of a green ethics.
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nonviolent resistance, solidarity, and green virtues and values. 34 This movement should also
materialize and strengthen its commitment to a future livable world by creating now the world
we need, a world of socialized renewable energy networks.35
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